6 Pakistani strategists argue that the Nasr adds value to Pakistan’s strategic nuclear forces at short ranges and is designed to meet evolving threats like Cold Start. The Cold Start doctrine was the direct outcome of the failure of India’s protracted mobilization and deployment along the border in the 2001–2002 crisis and the loss of strategic surprise in both the 2001–2002 and the 2008 crises. The majority of military strategists and decisionmakers in Pakistan agree that TNWs complete so-called full spectrum deterrence and, as such, are a necessary counterweight to India’s Cold Start, or proactive military operations, doctrine 5-which calls for up to eight independent armored brigades to penetrate up to 50 kilometers (about 31 miles) into Pakistan without crossing Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds. On the other side of the debate, Pakistani critics of their country’s battlefield nuclear policy basically echo themes found in international criticism. 3 These statements are the primary source of public information about the strategic rationale behind the Nasr tests, as well as information on how TNWs fit into Pakistan’s broader evolving nuclear posture. Pakistan’s official narrative on TNWs has been articulated through press releases from the ISPR, which issues brief statements on the purpose, type, and capabilities of each ballistic or cruise missile that Pakistan tests. 2 This section briefly discusses contrasting Pakistani perspectives on tactical nuclear weapons. Whereas the international debate on Pakistan’s perceived policy of battlefield nuclear weapons primarily consists of Western and Indian analysts, the debate within Pakistan takes place between serving and retired military officials and academics. This is followed by an evaluation of how TNWs impact Pakistan’s existing nuclear command and control system, how they interface with conventional forces and conventional force employment, and how they impact nuclear security and strategic stability in South Asia. The second section assesses the kinds of TNWs that Pakistan needs for effective deterrence, and assesses the relative importance of these weapons compared to Pakistan’s other strategic capabilities. The first section surveys different schools of thought in Pakistan about the issue of TNWs. This publication attempts to analyze various facets of the debate about tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) following the introduction of the Nasr battlefield ballistic missile. Official statements issued by Pakistan’s Inter Services Public Relations Directorate (ISPR) claim that the Nasr was developed “to add deterrence value to Pakistan’s Strategic Weapons Development programme at shorter ranges.” The Nasr could carry “nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy,” and had shoot-and-scoot attributes-essentially a “quick response system” that addressed “the need to deter evolving threats.” 1 The flight-testing of the 60-kilometer (or 37-mile) Hatf-IX, or Nasr, ballistic missile in April 2011 has renewed controversy and debate about strategic stability and nuclear weapons in South Asia. Mansoor Ahmed is a 2015–2016 Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
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